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SHOULD SHIELDING CHILDREN FROM INTERNET
PORNOGRAPHY AND PROTECTING FREE SPEECH
BE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE? ASHCROFT V.
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
Adam Gates1
I. INTRODUCTION
If you were to enter the search query: "How do you protect children
from Internet pornography while also protecting free speech?" into the
United States Supreme Court's database of legal knowledge, you might ex-
pect a search return riddled with ingenious and creative ideas for upholding
free speech while also screening children from sexually explicit material.
Unfortunately, the likely return you would receive is: "An answer to your
query could not be found."
In Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union,' the United States Su-
preme Court affirmed a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the
Child Online Protection Act (COPA), a congressional attempt to protect
minors from exposure to potentially harmful sexually explicit material on
the Internet. In affirming the injunction, a five-Justice majority held that
COPA was not the least restrictive alternative to further the compelling
interest that the legislation sought to achieve. Therefore, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction because
COPA was likely to burden protected speech.
This Note will discuss the Court's struggle to balance the freedom of
speech with protecting society, particularly children, from obscene mate-
rial, and how the Court has grappled with the difficult issue of determining
what speech warrants protection and what speech warrants regulation. In
addition, this Note addresses the Court's attempt to uphold and apply the
timeless values and rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the various
media produced by the recent technological revolution. Finally, this Note
debates the constitutional validity of COPA, discusses Congress's reliance
on prior precedent in drafting it, and ultimately asks whether the majority
proceeded appropriately.
1. Adam Gates graduted magna cum laude from Mississippi College School of Law in 2006. He
gratefully acknowledges Professor Mathew Steffey's guidance and encouragement during the drafting
of this Note. The author additionally would like to thank his wife Melanie for the many months of
understanding and support during the development of this Note.
2. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
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II. FACTS
In an attempt to protect children from pornography and other sexually
explicit material on the Internet, Congress enacted the Child Online Pro-
tection Act (COPA) in 2003, effectively criminalizing the posting of ob-
scene material that is harmful to minors.3 COPA was Congress's second
attempt to protect children from Internet pornography after the Communi-
cations Decency Act of 1996,' Congress's initial endeavor, was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU.5 On October 22,
1998, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and other entities con-
cerned with protecting free speech filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging the constitution-
ality of COPA under the First and Fifth Amendments and seeking injunc-
tive relief from its enforcement.6 The Pennsylvania district court heard
evidence and argument on the plaintiff's motion for a temporary re-
straining order, and the court subsequently entered such an order on No-
vember 20, 1998.' Arguments and testimony were taken from both parties
through late January of 1999, during which time briefs, expert reports, and
declarations from a multitude of the named plaintiffs were also submitted.8
In addition to the defendant's arguments in opposition to the preliminary
injunction, the defendant filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss the action based on the plaintiff's lack of standing.9 The
court deferred ruling on the defendant's motion until February 1, 1999,
when it granted the preliminary injunction.1 °
In advocating for the preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs claimed that
COPA burdened constitutionally protected speech, impinged the First
Amendment rights of minors, and was unconstitutionally vague under the
First and Fifth Amendments." Further, the plaintiffs asserted that the af-
firmative defenses provided by COPA did not relieve the burden on pro-
tected speech, but rather imposed economic and technological burdens on
Internet providers exhibiting no content harmful to minors.' 2 Alterna-
tively, the plaintiffs claimed that COPA would chill the free exchange of
ideas on the Internet because the overbroad statute "covers more speech
than it was intended to cover, even if it can be constitutionally applied to a
3. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2003).
4. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994 ed., Supp. II).
5. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
6. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
7. Id. at 477. The defendants agreed to an extension of the temporary restraining order through
Feb. 1, 1999, and the parties engaged in accelerated discovery thereafter. Due to the limited time, the
court decided that it would not consolidate the trial on the merits and the injunction hearing, and
proceeded only on the motion for preliminary injunction. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. "The plaintiffs filed a response to the motion to dismiss to which the defendants filed a
reply." Id.
10. Id. at 498.
11. Id. at 478-79.
12. Id. at 479.
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narrow class of speakers."' 3 Essentially, the plaintiffs argued that the de-
fendant could not justify the burden imposed on free speech by showing
that COPA was narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling government inter-
est or was the least restrictive means to accomplish the government's
goals.14
In rebuttal, the government argued that COPA did not restrict adults
from gaining access to material that is harmful to minors or inhibit the
ability of Internet providers to provide adults with such speech.15 The gov-
ernment argued that COPA's affirmative defenses provided a feasible
mechanism for websites containing potentially harmful materials to restrict
minors' access. 6 Moreover, the government maintained that COPA was
not directed at the content on the plaintiffs' sites, but targeted commercial
providers of pornography whose business revolved around exporting
materials harmful to minors, and therefore was not unconstitutionally over-
broad.' 7 Additionally, the government asserted that the plaintiffs could
not succeed on their motion for a preliminary injunction since their claim
of irreparable harm was speculative, and because the plaintiffs had failed to
show a likelihood of success on their assorted claims.' 8
After hearing testimony from witnesses for the government and the
multitude of parties seeking the injunction, the district court granted the
request for the preliminary injunction.' 9 In issuing the injunction, the dis-
trict court noted that enforcement of COPA would place a burden on some
protected speech, and further concluded that the "respondents were likely
to prevail on their argument that there were less restrictive alternatives to
the statute . ,2" The district court postulated that the government could
not satisfy the burden of proving that COPA constituted the least restric-
tive means available to achieve the purported goal of restricting minors'
access to potentially harmful material."1
The government appealed the district court's grant of a preliminary
injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
which affirmed the injunction.2" However, the court of appeals upheld the
injunction on different grounds, concluding that a portion of COPA's
§ 231(e)(6) definition of "[m]aterial that is harmful to minors" was uncon-







19. Id. at 498-99.
20. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 663 (2004) (citing Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497-99).
21. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
22. Id. at 498-99.
23. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2000) (construing 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)(A)).
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community standards" language of § 231(e)(6) rendered COPA unconstitu-
tional.24 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the nar-
row issue of whether the community standards language, standing alone,
caused COPA to be unconstitutional. 25 The Court reversed the Third Cir-
cuit's holding, emphasizing that the decision was limited to the specific is-
sue of the constitutionality of the community standards language, and
remanded the case back to the Third Circuit for continued review of the
district court's grant of the preliminary injunction.26
After reviewing the case on remand, the Third Circuit, learning from
its past miscalculation, affirmed the injunction and followed the district
court's reasoning.27 The Third Circuit held "that the statute was not nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling Government interest, was overbroad,
and was not the least restrictive means available for the Government to
serve the interest of preventing minors from using the Internet to gain ac-
cess to materials that are harmful to them. '2 8 Once again, the United
States Government sought certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted the
government's request to review the district court's grant of the preliminary
injunction. 9
The Supreme Court, considering the constitutionality of COPA a sec-
ond time, framed the issue as "whether the Court of Appeals was correct to
affirm a ruling by the District Court that enforcement of COPA should be
enjoined because the statute likely violate[d] the First Amendment."30
Since COPA imposed content-based restrictions on speech, the Court was
forced to presume that the restrictions were invalid in order to protect the
constitutionally mandated right to free speech.31 Therefore, the burden of
establishing COPA's constitutionality fell directly on the shoulders of the
government.32 After an examination of the record, the Court concluded
that the government failed to carry its burden of proving that COPA's re-
strictions were the least restrictive means to accomplish the compelling
governmental interest of protecting children from Internet pornography.33
Justice Kennedy, writing for a five-Justice majority, affirmed the decision of
the court of appeals upholding the preliminary injunction and remanded
the case to the district court for a trial on the relevant issues. 34
24. Id. "[Tihe average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking
the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to,
the prurient interest." 47 U.S.C. § 231 (e)(6)(A).
25. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (Ashcroft 1).
26. Id. at 585-86.
27. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2003).
28. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. at 664 (citing Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 243).
29. Id. at 660, cert. granted, 540 U.S. 944 (2003).
30. Id.
31. Id. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
32. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 660.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 661.
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III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
Throughout history, Americans, and therefore the Supreme Court,
have struggled with a conflict inherent in the exercise of all guaranteed
freedoms: striking the proper balance between the free exercise of certain
liberties and regulating the potential abuse of those enumerated freedoms.
One such sacred freedom, that of speech, specifically enumerated by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, has presented the
Court with challenging areas of constitutional interpretation, including the
regulation of obscene and indecent materials.
A. The Court's Early Struggles with Obscenity and the First Amendment
Surprisingly, not until 1957 was the Court presented with the disposi-
tive question of whether obscenity is protected by the First Amendment's
rights of free speech and freedom of the press. In Roth v. United States, the
Court stated that "[a]lthough this is the first time the question has been
squarely presented to this Court, either under the First Amendment or
under the Fourteenth Amendment, expressions found in numerous opin-
ions indicate that this Court has always assumed that obscenity is not pro-
tected by the freedoms of speech and press.
35
In Roth, the petitioner was convicted of mailing obscene matter under
a federal obscenity statute, and challenged the conviction on the grounds
that the statute violated his First Amendment rights.36 The Court con-
fronted the obscenity issue by first considering the historical context of ob-
scenity surrounding the drafting of the First Amendment.37 The Court
cited the presence of libel and obscenity laws during the time of drafting as
an indicator of an intent to exclude obscenity from the protective umbrella
of the First Amendment.38 "All ideas having even the slightest redeeming
social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hate-
ful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the
guarantees, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area
of more important interest., 39  The Court found implicit in the First
Amendment's history the rejection of obscenity as having any redeeming
social value, and therefore having no protection from regulation as exhib-
ited by the twenty obscenity laws enacted by Congress from 1842 to 1956.4°
35. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
36. Id. at 479-81.
37. Id. at 481-83.
38. Id. at 483.
39. Id. at 484. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); Int. Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944).
40. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (citing 5 Stat. 548, 566; 11 Stat. 168; 13 Stat. 504, 507; 17 Stat. 302; 17
Stat. 598; 19 Stat. 90; 25 Stat. 187, 188; 25 Stat. 496; 26 Stat. 567, 614-15; 29 Stat. 512; 33 Stat. 705; 35
Stat. 1129, 1138; 41 Stat. 1060; 46 Stat. 688; 48 Stat. 1091, 1100; 62 Stat. 768; 64 Stat. 194; 64 Stat. 451; 69
Stat. 183; 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1461-65; 39 U.S.C.A. § 259(a) & (b)); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
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Thus, the Court upheld the statute as constitutional, declaring that obscen-
ity is not protected under the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press.4"
Roth not only established that obscene material was not protected by
the First Amendment, but also endorsed the community standards test as a
constitutionally robust method for distinguishing obscene materials from
those possessing social value.42 The Court phrased the test as follows:
"whether to the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest. ' 43 Although the plaintiff claimed that this standard was
not precise enough to impose criminal penalties, the Court disagreed, de-
claring "[t]hat there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to deter-
mine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no
sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal
offense. "
4 4
Another federal obscenity statute challenge reached the Court in 1966.
In Ginzburg v. United States, the Court granted certiorari to determine
whether a district court conviction based on obscene advertising should be
reversed.45 Unlike Roth, the conviction in Ginzburg was not merely based
on the obscenity of the materials themselves, but on the obscene manner of
advertising, or pandering,46 employed by the petitioner.47 The Court
agreed with the government that while materials alone may not be obscene,
the setting in which they are presented is an aid in determining the ques-
tion of obscenity.48 Although one of the publications found to be obscene
was a handbook that had previously been sold exclusively to physicians and
had not been considered obscene in a medical context, the Court adjudged
the mailing of advertising to the public centered on the erotic aspects of the
book as obscene.49 The Court explained this distinction, maintaining that
while the book may have worth in the hands of medical experts, the peti-
tioners "did not sell the book to such a limited audience, or focus their
claims for it on its supposed therapeutic or educational value; rather, they
deliberately emphasized the sexually provocative aspects of the work, in
order to catch the salaciously disposed."5 Therefore, the Court held that
41. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
42. Id. at 489.
43. Id. The validity of the community standards test has been challenged throughout the years,
as recently as 2002. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
44. Roth, 354 U.S. at 491-92 (citations omitted).
45. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1966).
46. "[p]andering-'the business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised to ap-
peal to the erotic interest of their customers."' Id. at 467 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 495-96 (Warren,
C.J., concurring)).
47. Ginzburg, 383 U.S at 465.
48. Id. at 465-66.
49. Id. at 471.
50. Id. at 472.
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although a publication might not be obscene in one context, the same pub-
lication might be obscene if produced, sold, and publicized to a different
audience.51
Another notable milestone in the Supreme Court's line of cases in-
volving obscenity came in 1968 with the case of Ginsberg v. New York.52 In
Ginsberg, the Court considered whether a New York criminal obscenity
statute prohibiting the sale of material obscene to minors, but not necessa-
rily obscene to adults, was unconstitutional on its face.53 The appellant was
convicted under the statute of knowingly selling two "girlie" magazines to a
sixteen-year-old boy, and challenged the law on the basis that the State of
New York could not deny minors under seventeen years of age access to
materials that were not obscene for persons over seventeen.54 The Court
first established that "[o]bscenity is not within the area of protected speech
or press," but reasoned that the issue presented did not warrant the tradi-
tional Roth obscenity analysis. Rather, the pertinent issue was New York's
ability to define obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors.
The Court concluded that the state had the power to apply different
standards to minors and adults, recognizing that in past cases, "even where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms[,] 'the power of the state to con-
trol the conduct of the children reaches beyond the scope of its authority
over adults.' , 56 The Court also recognized New York's independent inter-
est in protecting children from potentially harmful materials and "'safe-
guard[ing] [them] from abuses' which might prevent their 'growth into free
and independent well-developed men and citizens."' 57 Referencing a law
review article on the concept of variable obscenity,58 which had proven
useful in a similar determination by the New York Court of Appeals,59 the
Court harkened back to Ginzburg-like reasoning, stating that the concept
of obscenity "may vary according to the group to whom the questionable
material is directed or from whom it is quarantined."60 Ultimately, the
Court held that the statute did not invade freedoms of expression constitu-
tionally secured to minors and that the New York legislature could ration-
ally conclude that a minor's exposure to such material might be harmful. It
also affirmed the state's interest in protecting minors from distribution of
objectionable materials even if recognized to be suitable for adults.61
51. Id. at 475-76.
52. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
53. Id. at 631.
54. Id. at 636. The Court conceded that "[t]he 'girlie' picture magazines involved in the sales
here are not obscene for adults." Id. at 635 (citing Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967)).
55. Id. at 635.
56. Id. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
57. Id. at 640-41 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 165).
58. William Lockhart & Robert McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitu-
tional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5 (1960).
59. People v. Tannenbaum, 220 N.E.2d 783 (N.Y. 1966).
60. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636.
61. Id. at 641-45.
2005]
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Another landmark case in the Court's struggle with "the intractable
obscenity problem '6 2 was Miller v. California,6 3 wherein the Court at-
tempted to tidy its stance on the proper analysis for determining obscenity.
As in many of the early obscenity cases, the appellant in Miller conducted a
mass-mailing campaign to advertise the sale of adult material, which led to
his conviction of a misdemeanor under the California Penal Code.64 Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the Court, reiterated that "[s]tates have a legiti-
mate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material
when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of of-
fending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to
juveniles."65 After a synopsis of Roth and Memoirs v. Massachusetts,66 the
Court began qualifying its holding before even prescribing the new test.
67
"State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully
limited,"68 and "[a]s a result, we now confine the permissible scope of such
regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct."69 However,
the Burger Court then, rather uncharacteristically, clearly dictated the
three-part test for determining obscenity that was later employed by the
Rehnquist Court:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest... ; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sex-
ual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;
and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.7"
In an attempt to quiet the concerns of the dissenting Justices, the Chief
Justice maintained that "[u]nder the holdings announced today, no one will
62. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
63. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
64. Id. at 16-18. Brochures advertising four books entitled Intercourse, Man-Woman, Sex Orgies
Illustrated, and An Illustrated History of Pornography were received by a restaurant. The envelope was
opened by the restaurant manager and his mother, together, neither of whom had requested the
brochures. Id. at 18.
65. Id. at 18-19.
66. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The Memoirs test for discerning obscenity
required the prosecution to affirmatively establish that the material being proscribed was utterly with-
out redeeming social value, a virtually impossible task. Memoirs was decided in 1966. By the time
Miller v. California reached the Court, however, the author of the Memoirs test, Justice Brennan, as
well as all the other members of the Court had abandoned the test as unworkable. See Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24.
68. Id. (See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682-85 (1968).
69. Id. at 24.
70. Id. (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 489 (1957))).
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be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials un-
less these materials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual
conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law . ,,7. The major-
ity thought that the specific prerequisites in its opinion provided fair notice
to persons engaged in businesses that may invite prosecution under federal
or state laws.72
Concluding, Chief Justice Burger concisely summarized the majority's
holding:
we (a) reaffirm the Roth holding that obscene material is
not protected by the First Amendment; (b) hold that such
material can be regulated by the States, subject to the spe-
cific standards enunciated above .. .and (c) hold that ob-
scenity is to be determined by applying "contemporary
community standards," . . . not national standards.
73
B. Modern Obscenity Decisions Involving Various Media
As the twentieth century progressed, new forms of technology devel-
oped, allowing messages, images, and videos to be transmitted with greater
ease and speed throughout the United States and the world. This techno-
logical revolution was not lost on those wishing to profit from selling por-
nography, and it was merely a matter of time and circumstance until the
highest court in the land was confronted with the "intractable obscenity
problem" in media other than the mailbox.
1. Telephones
In Sable Communications v. FCC,74 the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with a constitutional challenge to the Communications Act of
1934,"5 as amended by Congress in 1988 to ban indecent as well as obscene
interstate commercial telephone messages, also known as "dial-a-porn. "76
After witnessing repeated bouts between the FCC and dial-a-porn provid-
ers in various administrative and judicial fora over FCC regulations de-
signed to protect minors,77 Congress amended the Communications Act
"to prohibit indecent as well as obscene interstate commercial telephone
communications directed to any person regardless of age. "78
The Court framed its discussion by stating that "[s]exual expression
which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment;...
71. Id. at 27.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 36-37.
74. Sable Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
75. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1982 ed., Supp.V.).
76. Sable, 492 U.S. 115.
77. See Carlin Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1988) (Carlin III); Carlin Commc'ns,
Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986) (Carlin II); Carlin Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.
1984) (Carlin I).
78. Sable, 492 U.S. at 122.
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[t]he Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally
protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the
least restrictive means to further the articulated interest. ' 79 The govern-
ment argued that a total ban on dial-a-porn was justified because nothing
less could restrict minors from gaining access to the potentially harmful
messages.8" Although the Court recognized that protecting the psychologi-
cal and physical well being of children was certainly a compelling interest,81
it held that a total ban was constitutionally overreaching.82 The Court was
persuaded that the FCC's approach to restricting minors' access to dial-a-
porn-by requiring credit cards and access codes, by imposing scrambling
rules on providers-was a satisfactory solution.83 Therefore, the Court
held that the newly amended Communications Act's ban on dial-a-porn
was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest and was "another
case of 'burning the house to roast the pig. "84
2. City Ordinances
In Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., the Court considered the validity
of a municipal ordinance that prohibited adult movie theaters from locating
within 1000 feet of any residential zone, park, church, or school.85 The ap-
pellant claimed that the City of Renton's ordinance violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments since the city had improperly relied on the exper-
iences of other cities in creating the ordinance and had not established the
existence of a substantial government interest.86 The Court, in reversing
the Ninth Circuit's favorable judgment for the adult theaters, concluded
that the ordinance's restrictions were content neutral since they did not ban
adult theaters, but merely imposed time, place, and manner restrictions on
such expression in order to combat the negative secondary effects of the
theaters.87 The Court's holding effectively established that the First
Amendment is not infringed if a city can control the negative social effects
of adult-related businesses by exercising its zoning power while not materi-
ally interfering with the quantity and accessibility of adult-related
expression. 8
Approximately fifteen years later, in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books, Inc., the Court was forced "to clarify the standard for determining
79. Id. at 126.
80. Id. at 129.
81. Id. at 126.
82. Id. at 131.
83. Id. at 130.
84. Id. at 131 (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
85. Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986).
86. Id. at 43-46.
87. Id. at 46-49. Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down a St. Paul
Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance as not content neutral because it prohibited speech solely on the basis
of the subjects addressed by the speech).
88. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54-55.
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whether an ordinance serves a substantial government interest under Ren-
ton." 89 The Alameda Court summarized the Renton analysis as three steps:
first, an ordinance cannot ban adult theaters altogether, but only from
within certain distances from churches, schools, and other "sensitive" loca-
tions; second, the ordinance must be content neutral to escape strict scru-
tiny; and third, the city must show that its ordinance was enacted to
accomplish a substantial government interest and that reasonable alterna-
tive avenues of communication remained available.9" Further clarifying its
holding, the Court stated, "[in Renton, the Court distinguished the inquiry
into whether a municipal ordinance is content neutral from the inquiry into
whether it is 'designed to serve a substantial government interest and
do[es] not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication."' 91
The latter inquiry simply asks whether a municipality can demonstrate a
connection between the ordinance's regulated speech and the secondary
effects that spurred the adoption of the ordinance.92
The dispute in Alameda centered around an ordinance prohibiting
more than one adult establishment from doing business in the same build-
ing, and prohibiting such enterprises within 1000 feet of each other or
within 500 feet of a religious institution, school, or public park.93 The City
of Los Angeles based this ordinance on a 1977 study linking high concen-
trations of adult businesses with higher rates of crime than surrounding
communities, concluding that such an ordinance would effectively curb
criminal activity.94 Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not
agree with the city's assertion,95 the Supreme Court did, holding that the
city could reasonably rely on the study in enacting the ordinance, and that
reducing crime was a substantial government interest.96 The Court relied
on its prior holding, stating that "[i]n Renton, we specifically refused to set
such a high bar for municipalities that want to address merely the secon-
dary effects of protected speech." 97 The Court concluded that at that early
stage of litigation,98 the City of Los Angeles, by relying on the 1977 study,
had complied with its evidentiary burden of demonstrating a reasonably
relevant connection between the adult businesses and an increased crime
rate.9 9
89. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 433 (2002).
90. Id. at 434.
91. Id. at 440.
92. Id. at 441. "[A] municipality may rely on any evidence 'reasonably believed to be relevant'
for demonstrating a connection between speech and a substantial, independent government interest."
Id. at 438 (citing Renton, 475 U.S at 51-52).
93. Id. at 429-30.
94. Id. at 430.
95. Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 719, 728 (9th Cir. 2000).
96. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 435-36.
97. Id. at 438.
98. The case arrived at the Court on a motion for summary judgment by the adult theaters claim-
ing only that the 1977 study failed to prove the city's justification for its ordinance. Id. at 439.
99. Id. at 438-443.
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3. Cable Television
In the late 1980s, the majority of Americans began to enjoy the variety
provided by cable television, collectively breaking free from the antenna-
provided "Big Three''1°° and experiencing many new channels devoted to a
vast array of interests. Cable television provided a plethora of viewing op-
tions to an already couch-potato public, while also allowing many new par-
ties an avenue directly into America's living rooms. Due to the
revolutionary nature of this technology, regulation was inevitable.
One of these regulations, the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992 (The Act),10 1 was challenged in Denver Area
Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC.1 12 The petitioners,
cable television access programmers and cable viewers, appealed from a
judgment by the D.C. Circuit upholding the constitutionality of The Act's
provisions regulating the "broadcasting of 'patently offensive' sex-related
material on cable television. '"103 Three provisions were challenged by the
petitioners: one, § 10(a), permitted cable programmers to prohibit the
broadcast of self-defined sexually explicit material on "leased access chan-
nels;"'0 4 the second, § 10(b), required leased channel operators to block
the designated programming; and the third section, § 10(c), applied to the
regulation of "public, educational, or governmental channels."'05
In its analysis of the three provisions, the Court struck down sections
10(b) and 10(c) as unconstitutional, concluding that the restrictions were
not sufficiently narrowly tailored to accomplish the compelling governmen-
tal interest of protecting children from sexually graphic material.'0 6 How-
ever, the Court upheld section 10(a) of The Act, noting a child's easy access
to cable broadcasting and reasoning that the section addressed "an extraor-
dinarily important problem... the need to protect children from exposure
to patently offensive sex-related material."'0 7 Further, section 10(a)'s per-
missive nature, along with "its viewpoint-neutral application, [was] a con-
stitutionally permissible way to protect children from the type of sexual
material that concerned Congress," while also accommodating each party's
First Amendment rights.'08
100. ABC, NBC, and CBS.
101. 106 Stat. 1486, § 10(a), (b), & (c); 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) & (), and note following § 531.
102. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
103. Id. at 732.
104. "A 'leased channel' is a channel that federal law requires a cable system operator to reserve
for commercial lease by unaffiliated third parties. About 10 to 15 percent of a cable system's channels
would typically fall into this category." Id. at 734.
105. "'[P]ublic, educational, or governmental channels'.., are channels that, over the years, local
governments have required cable system operators to set aside for public, educational, or governmental
purposes as part of the consideration an operator gives in return for permission to install cables under
city streets and to use public rights-of-way." Id.
106. Id. at 753-66.
107. Id. at 743. See Sable Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
108. Denver, 518 U.S. at 747.
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4. Virtual Pornography
In a 2002 case, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,'0 9 the Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of a statute sharing with COPA the goal of pro-
tecting children. In Free Speech Coalition, a trade association of adult
businesses attacked provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996 (CPPA), 11° which banned sexually explicit images that appeared to
depict minors, either through use of youthful-looking adults or computer
imaging, but that were not produced using actual minors, a practice also
referred to as virtual pornography."' The Attorney General argued that
the prohibition of virtual child pornography was necessary to discourage
pedophilic activity and also to strip actual pedophiles of the defense of vir-
tual imaging.112 The Court held that the ban on virtual pornography was
unconstitutionally overbroad since the proscribed expression was neither
actual child pornography nor obscene, and was, therefore, entitled to pro-
tection under current precedent.1 3 Explaining the majority's holding, Jus-
tice Kennedy wrote, "[t]he overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government
from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected
speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.""' 4
A comparison could also be drawn between COPA's affirmative de-
fense provisions and CPPA section 2252A(c), which allowed a "defendant
to avoid conviction for nonpossession offenses by showing that the materi-
als were produced using only adults and were not otherwise distributed in a
manner conveying the impression that they depicted real children." '115
Through this provision, the government intended to shift the burden to the
accused to prove the speech in question was not in violation of CPPA after
prosecution had already begun. 16 The Court found, however, that this
provision raised serious constitutional concerns due to its narrow scope of
protection, effectively leaving "unprotected a substantial amount of speech
not tied to the Government's interest in distinguishing images produced
using real children from virtual ones."1 " 7 Exercising judicial restraint, the
Court declined to decide whether the government could impose the affirm-
ative defense burden on a speaker, adding that this particular "defense is
incomplete and insufficient, even on its own terms," and, hence, the provi-
sion could not save the statute. 18
109. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq.
111. Free Speech CoaL, 535 U.S. at 239-41.
112. Id. at 241-42.
113. Id. at 252-58.
114. Id. at 255.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 256.
118. Id.
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C. Struggling with the Entrance of an Unknown Entity:
The World Wide Web
Today, the Internet pervades American society. It has experienced
phenomenal growth and plays a crucial role in millions of lives on a daily
basis; thus, it is easy to forget that this behemoth was no more than a whis-
pered rumor in tech-savvy circles less than twenty years ago. Even in 1996,
when the Court heard Reno v. ACLU,n1 9 a challenge to the constitutional-
ity of the Communications Decency Act of 1997 (CDA), 12 ° Justice Stevens
felt obligated to dedicate three pages of the majority opinion to a general
overview of the Internet. He included a general introduction to the World
Wide Web and also acquainted the reader with some Internet jargon, in-
cluding terms such as "links," "mouse," "surfer" and "e-mail," with each
defined and printed in quotation marks.121 While these terms are now in
the vocabulary of the average seven-year-old, Justice Stevens felt the need
in 1997, only nine short years ago, to introduce these terms to the presuma-
bly educated readers of Supreme Court opinions. This demonstrates the
unprecedented growth of the Internet and the inherent difficulty of regulat-
ing and defining an exploding, evolving, and abstract entity.
In Reno, the Court addressed a challenge by numerous plaintiffs (in-
cluding the ACLU) to sections 223(a) and 223(d) of the CDA, with which
the government sought to protect minors from sexually explicit materials
on the Internet. 22 The government appealed from a preliminary injunc-
tion issued by a three-judge panel sitting for the District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania. The panel had held that the provisions were
too sweeping and were likely to chill the expression of adults. It also found
the definition of "obscene" to be unconstitutionally vague.'23
The majority opinion affirmed the lower court's ruling. The Court
found that specific portions of the CDA were unconstitutional; they lacked
important features of previously upheld statutes, such as parental consent,
a concrete definition of "indecent," a limitation of application to only com-
mercial transactions, no punitive provisions, and content-neutrality.
1 2 4
Justice Stevens, writing for a seven-Justice majority, first reviewed the
principal authorities relied upon by the government-Ginsberg v. New
York, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, and Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.
125
The majority reasoned that the CDA differed from the New York state
statute upheld in Ginsberg in four respects: first, the New York statute did
not bar parents from purchasing regulated magazines for their children if
they wished; second, the New York statute applied to commercial transac-
tions only; third, the New York statute required proscribed material to be
119. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
120. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
121. Reno, 521 U.S. at 850-53.
122. Id. at 861-62.
123. Id. at 862-63.
124. Id. at 865-85.
125. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978);
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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"utterly without redeeming social importance for minors," while the CDA
had no such requirement; and finally, the New York statute described a
minor to be any person under seventeen, while the CDA classified minors
as persons under eighteen years of age.126 Furthermore, the order issued
by the FCC in Pacifica was a limitation on when an indecent radio broad-
cast could be made as opposed to whether it could be broadcast. The
Court also made a distinction between the different media, reasoning that a
radio listener could not be adequately protected from unexpected pro-
gramming, while the risk of encountering indecent material through the
Internet "by accident is remote because a series of affirmative steps is re-
quired to access specific material. ' 127 The Court also distinguished the
government's argument from its holding in Renton, stating that "the CDA
is a content-based blanket restriction on speech," while the zoning ordi-
nance in Renton was aimed at combating the secondary effects of adult
expression and not the expression itself.128 The Court declared, "[t]hese
precedents, then, surely do not require us to uphold the CDA and are fully
consistent with the application of the most stringent review of its
provisions.
' 2 1
The government also argued that since the CDA's "patently offensive"
standard is one prong of the obscenity test in Miller v. California,3 ° it
could not be unconstitutionally vague.131 The Court disagreed, holding
that the Miller definition of "patently offensive" was much narrower, and
that the remaining two prongs of the test not included in the CDA were
essential to the obscenity analysis. 32 The Court went on to reiterate its
holding in Sable Communications v. FCC,133 stating that "we have made it
perfectly clear that '[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is
protected by the First Amendment.'" 34 Therefore, the CDA failed to sat-
isfy the strict scrutiny applied to content-based statutes by not being nar-
rowly tailored or the least restrictive method to accomplish the
government's concededly compelling interest.
Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice, wrote a concurring
opinion reasoning that the CDA was merely "an attempt by Congress to
create 'adult zones' on the Internet.' 1 35 She recognized the government's
right to create these adult zones, stating, "[s]tates have long denied minors
access to certain establishments frequented by adults .... The Court has
previously sustained such zoning laws. "136 Justice O'Connor acknowl-
edged that a "zoning" law is valid only if adults are still able to obtain the
126. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865-66.
127. Id. at 867.
128. Id. at 867-68.
129. Id. at 868.
130. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (see discussion supra text accompanying notes 62-73).
131. Reno, 521 U.S. at 873.
132. Id.
133. Sable Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
134. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 126).
135. Id. at 886.
136. Id. at 887-88.
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regulated speech. 3 7 Therefore, according to O'Connor, the CDA was in-
valid since it restricted adult access to protected materials in some circum-
stances. However, the statute was unconstitutional only in that sense.'38
In a later case, United States v. Playboy, the Justices foreshadowed
their current positions on the difficult balance between free speech and
protecting children from sexually explicit material.' 39 Although Playboy
did not factually involve the Internet, the Court's conclusion and subse-
quent division had a deep impact upon the analysis applied in those dis-
putes. Playboy involved an appeal to the Court by cable television
programmers to find unconstitutional the "signal bleed" provision of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,140 which required programmers either to
scramble sexually explicit channels or to limit broadcasting them to specific
time slots.' 4 ' In finding section 505 of the Telecommunications Act uncon-
stitutional, the Court first acknowledged that the regulation was content
based since it applied only "to channels primarily dedicated to 'sexually
explicit adult programming or other programming that is indecent.' "142 As
a practical matter, the Court found the only way channels could comply
with the Act was to limit broadcasts, which resulted in protected speech
being silenced for two-thirds of the day, regardless of the presence of mi-
nors or the wishes of the viewers."' 3 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court
relied on the district court's finding that section 504 of the statute (which
allowed subscribers to request cable operators to block or fully scramble
certain channels) was a less restrictive alternative to section 505.144 Based
on the government's inability to satisfy its burden of showing that section
505 was "the least restrictive means for addressing a real problem," the
Court affirmed the district court's ruling that the provision violated the
First Amendment.
1 45
The issue in Playboy divided the Court, with five Justices finding the
Telecommunications Act unconstitutional and four arguing to uphold the
statute, the same split in Ashcroft v. ACL U.1 46 The majority opinion in
Playboy, written by Justice Kennedy, was joined by Justices Stevens, Sou-
ter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, while Justice Scalia drafted his own dissent and
joined in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, which was also joined by Jus-
tice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist.1
47
137. Id. at 888.
138. Id.
139. United States v. Playboy, 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
140. 47 U.S.C. § 561 (2000).
141. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 806. "[Tlhe statute and its implementing regulations require cable oper-
ators either to scramble a sexually explicit channel in full or to limit the channel's programming to the
hours between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m." Id. at 808.
142. Id. at 811.
143. Id. at 812.
144. Id. at 816-27.
145. Id. at 827.
146. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
147. Playboy, 529 U.S. 803. Justice Stevens also joined the fray with his own concurrence specifi-
cally criticizing Justice Scalia's claims of pandering. Id. at 828.
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Justice Scalia's dissent argued that section 505 of the statute could eas-
ily be upheld "by finding that it regulates the business of obscenity."' 48
Although Justice Scalia conceded that many of the individual programs
broadcast were not obscene, he found that the channels, as commercial en-
tities, had engaged "in the sordid business of pandering" and therefore,
were not constitutionally protected.'49 He explained, "[w]e are more per-
missive of government regulation in these circumstances because it is clear
from the context in which exchanges between such businesses and their
customers occur that neither the merchant nor the buyer is interested in the
work's literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."' 150 Justice Scalia con-
cluded that since the government could completely block the broadcasts,
section 505's limiting effects were constitutional as a restraint on unpro-
tected speech.15'
Justice Breyer arrived at a different conclusion from the majority opin-
ion by defining the issue in a different light. He interpreted the Telecom-
munications Act, specifically sections 504 and 505, to allow viewers to
choose whether their households should receive adult programming by re-
questing it through section 505 or by specifically requesting not to receive
channels dedicated to adult programming through section 504.152 Justice
Breyer implicitly faulted the majority for claiming that the Act focused too
intently on "signal bleed," as he felt the statute addressed the issue only
indirectly.' 53 Further, he did not see the Act as effecting a complete ban on
the programming in contention, but merely imposing a burden on adult
speech by regulating the time of broadcast.5 4 He thought that burden ac-
ceptable, stating, "this Court has upheld laws that do not ban the access of
adults to sexually explicit speech, but burden that access through geograph-
ical or temporal zoning." '155 Finally, Justice Breyer dismissed the argument
that the programs had any value outside of prurient interest, declaring that
"[t]he channels do not broadcast more than trivial amounts of more serious
material such as birth control information, artistic images, or the visual
equivalents of classical or serious literature."' 56
Justice Breyer's dissent also challenged the majority's contention that
the government had not established signal bleed as a "pervasive prob-
lem." '157 He posed an intriguing question:
148. Id. at 831 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 831-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 467,
472 (1966)).
150. Id. at 832.
151. Id. at 835 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 837 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 837-38.
154. Id. at 838.
155. Id. See, e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
156. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 839 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
157. "There is little hard evidence of how widespread or how serious the problem of signal bleed
is." Id. at 819.
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If signal bleed is not a significant empirical problem, then
why, in light of the cost of its cure, must so many cable oper-
ators switch to nighttime hours? ... If, as the majority sug-
gests, the signal bleed problem is not significant, then there
is also no significant burden on speech created by § 505.
The majority cannot have this evidence both ways.'
158
Clearly, Justice Breyer disagreed with the majority's framing of the
issue and interpretation of the government's evidence; however, his "major
point of disagreement" with the majority opinion was the finding that sec-
tion 504 constituted a less restrictive alternative.1 5 9 Breyer prefaced his
analysis of section 504 by noting, "a 'less restrictive alternativ[e]' must be
Cat least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was
enacted to serve."' 160 Breyer's dissent characterized section 504 as al-
lowing parents to tell cable operators to keep adult channels out of their
cable subscription, while section 505 blocked adult programming unless
parents explicitly consented to its transmission into their home.161 Breyer
found that section 505 served the same interest as commonly upheld zoning
laws that deny children the right to enter X-rated theaters or adult cabarets
when parents cannot exercise supervision of the child's actions. 62 In find-
ing that section 505's restrictions were constitutionally permissible, Breyer
relied on the government's compelling interest in helping parents prevent
minors from accessing sexually explicit materials, concluding that section
505 "restricts speech no more than necessary to further that compelling
need.
163
As recently as the spring of 2003, in United States v. American Library
Ass'n, the Court passed judgment on the constitutionality of the Children's
Internet Protection Act (CIPA), an elder sibling of COPA, holding that
compliance with the statute would not violate the First Amendment.
164
CIPA forbade libraries from receiving federal assistance unless the library
installed filtering software to block access to obscene or pornographic
images and to prevent minors from gaining access to such materials. 65 A
group of library patrons, website publishers, and other parties similarly af-
fected by CIPA challenged the statute and prevailed at the district court
level, the court holding that Congress had exceeded its spending power by
forcing libraries to effectively violate the First Amendment in order to re-
ceive federal funding. 66 The district court found that CIPA provisions con-
stituted a content-based restriction on public fora warranting strict scrutiny
158. Id. at 840 (emphasis omitted).
159. Id. at 840-41.
160. Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997)).
161. Id. at 841-42 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 842.
163. Id. at 846.
164. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 202-03.
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and that the filtering software required by CIPA was not the least restric-
tive alternative to accomplish the government's objective.
167
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Thomas, and
Scalia, considered the history and purpose of the library system and found
that libraries were not created as public fora per se; rather, public libraries
were created to facilitate research, learning, and recreational reading. 68
The Court held that precedent validated CIPA's restrictions because "Con-
gress has wide latitude to attach conditions to the receipt of federal assis-
tance in order to further its policy objectives," and, therefore, the
application of strict scrutiny and public forum analysis by the district court
was not proper. 169 Moreover, the plurality opinion reasoned that since a
library's duty is to exercise judgment in making collection decisions and to
satisfy "its traditional role in identifying suitable and worthwhile material[,]
it is no less entitled to play that role when it collects material from the
Internet than when it collects material from any other source. "170 The
Court acknowledged that a site-by-site qualifying by each library is unreal-
istic; therefore, in order to distinguish appropriate material from obscene
material, CIPA's provisions were entirely reasonable. 71
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion appeared clear
and well reasoned, several other Justices disagreed with either the method
the Chief Justice employed to reach his conclusion or the conclusion itself.
Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer each drafted separate concurrences,
Justice Stevens filed his own dissent, and Justice Ginsberg joined the dis-
senting opinion of Justice Souter. Each opinion espoused a different ap-
proach to the mixed First Amendment/Spending Clause issue; however, the
most notable, due to an apparent change of heart in subsequent opinions,
was Justice Stevens's dissent. He concluded that CIPA was "a blunt nation-
wide restraint on adult access to 'an enormous amount of valuable informa-
tion,"' and that there are "fundamental defects in the filtering software
that is now available or that will be available in the foreseeable future.
1 72
Stevens found that since "software relies on key words or phrases to block
undesirable sites, it does not have the capacity to exclude a precisely de-
fined category of images. "173 He concluded that the filtering software
would result in "underblocking," a process that allows some sexually ex-
plicit material to pass through while giving parents a false sense of security,
and also "overblocking" of thousands of sites containing innocuous mate-
rial.1 74 Colorfully expressing his disdain for CIPA's required filtering
software, Justice Stevens stated, "[i]n my judgment, a statutory blunderbuss
167. Id.
168. Id. at 203-04.
169. Id. at 203-05. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); Nat'l En-
dowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
170. Am. Library, 539 U.S. at 208.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 220-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 221.
174. Id. at 222.
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that mandates this vast amount of 'overblocking' abridges the freedom of
speech protected by the First Amendment.
1' 75
IV. INSTANT CASE
A. Majority Opinion of the Court
In Ashcroft v. ACLU, a five-Justice majority 176 of the United States
Supreme Court affirmed a preliminary injunction against enforcement of
the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) issued by the District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and remanded the case to the district
court for a trial on the issues.1 77 The majority opinion, delivered by Justice
Kennedy, framed the issue as "whether the court of appeals was correct to
affirm a ruling by the district court that enforcement of COPA should be
enjoined because the statute likely violates the First Amendment.'
17
Justice Kennedy described COPA as a statute enacted by Congress to
protect minors from exposure to sexually explicit materials on the Internet
whose drafters gave consideration to the Court's earlier decisions on the
subject. 179 Justice Kennedy recognized the drafters' consideration of these
precedents, commenting on the judiciary's duty to proceed carefully in con-
sidering the constitutionality of COPA in order to accord respect to Con-
gress. He balanced this assertion, however, noting that "according respect
to Congress ... does not permit us to depart from well-established First
Amendment principles.""18 The majority construed COPA as a content-
based restriction on speech, and therefore to "guard against that threat the
Constitution demands content-based restrictions on speech be presumed
invalid ...and that the Government bear the burden of showing their
constitutionality."18' Justice Kennedy, along with the other four Justices in
the majority, agreed with the district court judge's conclusion that the gov-
ernment had failed in its attempt to satisfy its burden by rebutting the
plaintiffs' assertion that there were less restrictive alternatives to the provi-
sions of COPA. 182
The Court first reviewed the COPA provisions at issue, explaining that
"COPA imposes criminal penalties of a $50,000 fine and six months in
prison for the knowing posting, for 'commercial purposes,' of World Wide
Web content that is 'harmful to minors.' "83 COPA defines a minor as
"any person under 17 years of age,"'184 and material harmful to minors as:
175. Id.
176. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 659 (2004) (Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion
of the Court which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 660.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. (citation omitted).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 661 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2000)).
184. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(7).
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[A]ny communication, picture, image, graphic image file, ar-
ticle, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is
obscene or that-(A) the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards, would find, taking the mate-
rial as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to
appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently
offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sex-
ual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or
perverted sex act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or
post-pubescent female breast; and (C) taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors.18
Other pertinent provisions included the definition of a person acting
for "commercial purposes," which COPA defined as any "person engaged
in the business of making such communications."'18 6 Hence, the following
definition of "engaged in the business" was also required:
[T]he person who makes a communication, or offers to
make a communication, by means of the World Wide Web,
that includes any material that is harmful to minors, devotes
time, attention, or labor to such activities (although it is not
necessary that a person make a profit or that the making or
offering to make such communications be the person's sole
or principal business or source of income). A person may
be considered to be engaged in the business of making, by
means of the World Wide Web, communications for com-
mercial purposes that include material that is harmful to mi-
nors, only if the person knowingly causes the material that is
harmful to minors to be posted on the World Wide Web or
knowingly solicits such material to be posted on the World
Wide Web ... 187
COPA's drafters also included an affirmative defense provision to narrow
the statute's broad scope:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section
that the defendant, in good faith, has restricted access by
minors to material that is harmful to minors-(A) by re-
quiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code,
or adult personal identification number; (B) by accepting a
185. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)(A)(B)(C).
186. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(A).
187. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(B).
20051
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digital certificate that verifies age; or (C) by any other rea-
sonable measures that are feasible under available
technology.
188
The Court, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard on the review of
the preliminary injunction, preceded its analysis by stating that "[i]f the
underlying constitutional question is close, therefore, we should uphold the
injunction and remand for trial on the merits. ' 189 Referencing the district
court's holding that COPA was likely to burden some speech protected for
adults, Justice Kennedy eschewed the Third Circuit's ambitious construc-
tion of COPA's provisions and declined to consider the correctness of the
Third Circuit's statutory construction. 190 In granting the preliminary in-
junction, the district court had to decide whether the plaintiff was likely to
prevail on the merits of the case. 91 Since the burden was on the govern-
ment, the plaintiffs were presumed to prevail unless the government could
show that the plaintiffs' proposed alternatives were less effective than
COPA. 192 The majority concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated they were likely
to prevail on the merits since the government did not carry its burden by
proving COPA the least restrictive alternative.
Since the district court agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that less
restrictive alternatives existed, the Supreme Court engaged in an analysis
to determine whether the district court abused its discretion based on its
conclusion. The purpose of the least-restrictive-alternative inquiry "is to
ensure that speech is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the
goal, for it is important to assure that legitimate speech is not chilled or
punished."1 93 Further, the Court noted that the proper inquiry is "whether




Justice Kennedy first addressed blocking and filtering software, finding
that the "software is an alternative that is less restrictive than COPA, and,
in addition, likely more effective as a means of restricting children's access
to materials harmful to them." 195 The majority considered filtering and
blocking software less restrictive than COPA because the software imposes
selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end of the transmission as
opposed to the source.1 96 Moreover, the Court found that the software
allowed adults to gain access to COPA-regulated speech without having to
identify themselves or provide credit card information, and also allowed
188. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (c)(1)(A)(B)(C).
189. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 664-65 (2004).
190. Id. at 665.




195. Id. at 667.
196. Id.
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parents to switch the filter on and off to protect their children while acces-
sing the speech themselves. 197 Most important to the Court was that the
filtering software did not impose any criminal penalties on speech as COPA
did, which the Court found had the potential to chill forms of protected
speech.198
The Court also agreed with the district court that filtering software
may possibly be more effective than COPA's provisions since one district
court witness testified that approximately forty percent of pornography
originates outside of the United States, and therefore outside of COPA's
jurisdiction.' 99 The majority felt that this "alone makes it possible that fil-
tering software might be more effective in serving Congress's goals."200
Also, the Court postulated that if COPA were upheld, the statute could be
circumvented by pornographers moving their operations to foreign soil or
by children acquiring and using their own credit cards to access the sites.20'
Justice Kennedy also cited the findings of the Commission on Child Online
Protection, a committee that studied the various means of restricting mi-
nors' access to harmful materials on the Internet, which found that filters
are more effective than age-verification requirements. 20 2 Thus, the Court
concluded that not only had the government failed to satisfy its burden of
showing the proposed alternatives were less effective, but a government
commission appointed to consider the issue designated the proposed alter-
natives (filtering and blocking software) more effective as well.20 3
Justice Kennedy did, however, acknowledge that filtering and blocking
software "is not a perfect solution to the problem of children gaining access
to harmful-to-minors materials., 2 4 The majority found that while filtering
software may be overinclusive as well as underinclusive, the government
failed to present specific evidence to the district court proving that.205
Since the government did not present sufficient evidence of filtering
software's weaknesses, it failed to carry the burden of showing that
COPA's provisions were superior to the proposed alternatives and hence it
was proper for the district court to grant the preliminary injunction.20 6
The majority opinion then specifically addressed, either through a
sense of obligation or in defense of itself, the contrary argument that "fil-
tering software is not an available alternative because Congress may not
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 667.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 667-68.
202. Id. at 668 (citing Commission on Child Online Protection, Report to Congress, at 19-21,
23-25, 27 (Oct. 20, 2000), assigning a score for "effectiveness" of 7.4 for server-based filters and 6.5 for
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206. Id. at 669.
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require it to be used. '2 ° 7 Justice Kennedy declared that this argument car-
ried "little weight, because Congress undoubtedly may act to encourage the
use of filters," referring to precedent in which the Court had already held
that Congress could provide incentives to schools and libraries to use the
technology. 20 8 Kennedy also argued that Congress "could also take steps
to promote their development by industry, and their use by parents.
20 9
The majority opinion argued that the need for parental cooperation did not
prevent an alternative from being feasible, and that by providing incentives
Congress could effectively give parents the ability to protect their children
without subjecting protected speech to potentially severe penalties.210
Justice Kennedy also referred to the Court's decision in United States
v. Playboy,21 1 calling the opinion the "closest precedent on the general
point" and stating that the reasoning in that opinion required the Court to
affirm the preliminary injunction.212 Playboy involved a similar choice for
the Court between a "blanket speech restriction and a more specific tech-
nological solution that was available to parents who chose to implement
it."'2 13 The Court found in Playboy that the government failed to meet its
burden of showing that the proposed less restrictive alternative was less
effective and therefore did not survive strict scrutiny.214 Relying on the
reasoning of Playboy, the majority opinion reasserted that the preliminary
injunction should be affirmed since "[t]o do otherwise would be to do less
than the First Amendment commands.,
215
Justice Kennedy next enumerated four "practical reasons" why the
preliminary injunction should stand pending a trial on the merits.21 6 First,
the majority contended that "the potential harms from reversing the in-
junction outweigh those of leaving it in place by mistake" due to the poten-
tial for self-censorship and chill of protected speech.21 7 In addition, the
possibility of disrupting any prosecutions under COPA is nonexistent since
no charges have been filed under the statute. a 8 Second, a gap in the evi-
dence as to the effectiveness of filtering software exists that should be ad-
dressed at trial.219 Third, the factual record did not represent the current
state of technology due to the district court's fact-finding taking place in
207. Id. at 669.
208. Id. (citing United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 669-70.
211. United States v. Playboy, 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (see discussion supra text accompanying notes
139-64).
212. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 670.
213. Id.
214. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 826.
215. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 670.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 670-71.
218. Id. at 671.
219. Id.
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1999, over five years before this case.22 ° The Court recognized that a tem-
poral delay in fact-finding is inevitable, but this dispute's procedural back-
ground was exceptional because of the quick evolution of the Internet and
the fact that this was the case's second trip to the Supreme Court. 21 Thus,
"[riemand [would] . . . permit the district court to take account of the
changed legal landscape.
222
Kennedy's final "practical reason" offered a ray of hope to the govern-
ment: "this opinion does not hold that Congress is incapable of enacting
any regulation of the Internet designed to prevent minors from gaining ac-
cess to harmful materials. ' 223 The majority felt that by remanding the case,
the parties could offer new evidence to further examine the effectiveness
and feasibility of alternatives to the statute.2 2 4 The Court made clear that
its opinion did not prevent the "District Court from concluding, upon a
proper showing by the Government that meets the Government's constitu-
tional burden as defined in this opinion, that COPA is the least restrictive
alternative available to accomplish Congress's goal. '225 Following his hope-
inspiring words for congressional drafters, Justice Kennedy concluded the
majority opinion with the equivalent of a splash of cold water on Con-
gress's collective face, reasserting the Court's affirmation of the prelimi-
nary injunction, its finding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion, and remanding the case back to the district court for a trial on
the merits.2 2 6
B. Concurring Opinion of Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsberg, agreed with the conclusion
of the majority, but did not believe that the reasons cited by the majority
were the only characteristics of COPA that rendered it (or were likely to
render the statute) unconstitutional.227 Justice Stevens took the opportu-
nity to reiterate his agreement with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
Ashcroft 1,228 regarding the contention that COPA's "community stan-
dards" language singularly caused the statute to be unconstitutional. 229 "I
continue to believe that the Government may not penalize speakers for
making available to the general World Wide Web audience that which the
least tolerant communities in America deem unfit for their children's
consumption.' ' 0
220. Id.
221. Id. at 671-72.
222. Id. at 672.
223. Id.
224. Id. 672-73.
225. Id. at 673.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 673-74 (Stevens, J., concurring).
228. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
229. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 673 (Stevens, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 674.
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Stevens also wrote to express agreement with the majority's finding
that filtering technology would serve Congress's interest in protecting chil-
dren as well as or better than COPA's provisions, and "to underscore just
how restrictive COPA is."'2 31 Stevens described COPA as "a content-based
restraint on the dissemination of constitutionally protected speech" that
used criminal prosecution as punishment for noncompliant speakers.232
Moreover, Justice Stevens also expressed his disdain with COPA's poten-
tial for burden shifting, remarking that even speakers who abide with
COPA by requiring age verification may shoulder the burden of proving, in
court, their compliance with the statute.233 Stevens's main point of conten-
tion, however, was with COPA's criminal penalties, which he declared "in-
appropriate means to regulate the universe of material classified as
'obscene,"' and which imposed a heavy burden on the exercise of free
speech. 34
In closing, Justice Stevens made a point of expressing his agreement
that protecting minors from sexually explicit materials is a compelling gov-
ernment interest, and as a "parent, grandparent, and great-grandparent" he
endorsed that goal whole-heartedly.235 However, he felt the gravity of the
burdens imposed upon free speech by COPA were not justified simply to
act as a backup for adult oversight of children.236
C. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia's dissent stayed the course regarding his stance on ob-
scenity-regulating statutes, as he concluded that COPA was constitutional
since commercial pornography "could, consistent with the First Amend-
ment, be banned entirely. '237 Scalia agreed with Justice Breyer's conclu-
sion that COPA was constitutional, although he argued that Justice Breyer
and the majority erred in applying strict scrutiny.238 Scalia asserted, "we
have recognized that commercial entities which engage in 'the sordid busi-
ness of pandering' by 'deliberately emphasiz[ing] the sexually provocative
aspects of [their non-obscene products], in order to catch the salaciously
disposed,' engage in constitutionally unprotected behavior.
239
Justice Scalia also construed COPA more narrowly than the majority,
finding that COPA applied only to persons who knowingly, in the regular





235. Id. at 675 (Stevens, J., concurring).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 676 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238. Id.
239. Id. (citing United States v. Playboy, 529 U.S. 803, 831 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 467 (1966)). See also City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books,
Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 443-44 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 256-61
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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appeal to, or designed to pander to, the prurient interest. ' 24" Based on this
construction of COPA's provisions and the conclusion that strict scrutiny
was not warranted, Scalia proclaimed COPA to be of no constitutional
concern.
241
D. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Breyer
Espousing a narrow construction of COPA and a more in-depth "less-
restrictive-alternative" analysis, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor
and Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented, concluding that "the Act (COPA),
properly interpreted, imposes a burden on protected speech that is no
more than modest., 24 2 Justice Breyer wrote to express his disagreement
with the majority's assertion that "Congress could have accomplished its
statutory objective-protecting children from commercial pornography on
the Internet-in other, less restrictive ways."
24 3
Justice Breyer began his analysis by reasoning that "the term 'less re-
strictive alternative' is a comparative term," and therefore a proper deter-
mination of constitutionality cannot be made without first examining the
extent of the burden COPA imposes on protected speech.244 By comparing
the Court's definition of "legally obscene" from Miller v. California245 with
COPA's definitions, Breyer found that COPA applied to material that did
not enjoy First Amendment protection, "and very little more. ' 24 6 Breyer
found "[t]he only significant difference between the present statute and
Miller's definition consists of the addition of the words 'with respect to
minors' and 'for minors.' , 247 He argued that this addition of words to the
Miller definition only slightly expanded the scope of the test due to the
limiting requirement that the material must first appeal to the prurient in-
terest.248 "And material that appeals to the 'prurient interests' of some
groups of adolescents or post-adolescents will almost inevitably appeal to
the 'prurient interests' of some groups of adults as well. '249
Breyer also argued that COPA's "lack of serious value" provision
acted to narrow the statute even further since speech that has serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value for adults will have the same value
for minors and therefore would not be affected.2 50 Breyer purported to
construe the provisions of COPA literally, consistent with Congress's intent
of "putting material produced by professional pornographers behind
240. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)(A)).
241. Id. at 676 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 677-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 677.
244. Id.
245. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
246. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 678 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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screens that will verify the age of the viewer. "251 Justice Breyer felt that
the narrow construction of COPA's provisions answered the majority of
free-speech concerns of the respondents and the majority opinion. 252 To
demonstrate the proper application of the COPA test, Justice Breyer cited
an array of borderline materials, from "a serious discussion about birth
control practices" to "J.D. Salinger's Catcher in the Rye," finding that none
of this protected speech satisfied COPA's two-prong test of appealing to
prurient interest and lacking in serious value. 5 3
Based on his construction of COPA, Justice Breyer concluded that the
statute's definitions limited the scope of the law to commercial
pornographers, thus only affecting unprotected obscene material.254 He
conceded, however, that even narrowly construed, COPA could act to chill
the production of a limited class of close-to-obscene material.255
Justice Breyer also recognized that "the screening requirement im-
poses some burden on adults who seek access to the regulated material, as
well as on its providers. '256 Referencing the district court's fact-finding,
Breyer briefly discussed the added cost to website operators and pointed
out that a trade association for commercial pornographers characterized
the use of age verification as "'standard practice' in their online opera-
tions. "257 In addition to the monetary cost to website providers, Justice
Breyer also recognized that a portion of users would not access regulated
sites due to fear of embarrassment. 258 "But this Court has held that in the
context of congressional efforts to protect children, restrictions of this kind
do not automatically violate the Constitution. '259 Breyer again asserted
that, at most, COPA's provisions imposed "a modest additional burden on
adult access to legally obscene material . "..."260
Justice Breyer then discussed the effectiveness of COPA in advancing
the compelling interest of protecting children from commercial pornogra-
phy. He began by rebutting the majority's assertion that filtering software
was a less restrictive alternative, labeling this "a misnomer-a misnomer
that may lead the reader to believe that all we need do is look to see if the
blocking and filtering software is less restrictive ... "261 Breyer contended
that filtering software was "part of the status quo, i.e., the backdrop against
251. Id. at 680 (citing S. Rep. No. 105-225, p. 3 (1998)).
252. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 681.
255. Id. at 681-82.
256. Id. at 682.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 682-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 683. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 209 (2003) (plurality opin-
ion) ("[T]he Constitution does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a public library without
any risk of embarrassment").
260. Id.
261. Id. at 683-84.
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which Congress enacted the present statute," and therefore was not an al-
ternative solution.262 Based on this assertion, he declared, "[i]t is always
less restrictive to do nothing than to do something. ' 263 Therefore, Breyer
reasoned, since filtering software was currently available and employed by
those wishing to filter certain materials, and children were still being ex-
posed to harmful material on the Internet, filtering software was clearly not
a more effective alternative to COPA.26 4
Justice Breyer asserted that filtering software also suffered from "four
serious inadequacies that prompted Congress to pass legislation instead of
relying on its voluntary use. "265 First, Breyer characterized filtering
software as faulty, using Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in United
States v. American Library Ass'n to illustrate his point.266 Breyer agreed
with Stevens's statement that there are "fundamental defects in the filter-
ing software that is now available or that will be available in the foresee-
able future. ' ' 267  Breyer also noted that filtering software was not
sophisticated enough to precisely define a specific category of images, re-
sulting in children still potentially being exposed to harmful material.268
Second, Breyer pointed out that filtering software was certainly not free
and that not all families had the means to purchase the software. 69 Third,
Breyer noted that filtering software relies on parents' will and ability to use
it, which may not be a reasonable reliance given the state of the average
American family.27° Fourth in Breyer's quadrangle of fault was filtering
software's propensity for overblocking material containing valuable and
protected information. He relied on the ACLU's assertion to Congress
that "the software is simply incapable of discerning between constitution-
ally protected speech and unprotected speech.,
271
Addressing the majority's counterargument that even if COPA were
upheld, forty percent of pornography is of foreign origin and therefore un-
affected by the statute, Breyer argued that COPA would make a difference
with respect to sixty percent of commercial pornography on the Internet, a
number he could not call insignificant.272 He also concluded that it would
be reasonable for Congress to conclude, based on an ineffective status quo
involving filtering software, that "adding an age-verification requirement
for a narrow range of material[] would more effectively shield children
262. Id. at 684 (italics omitted).
263. Id. (italics omitted).
264. Id. at 684 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 684-85.
266. Id. at 685. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 221 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
267. Am. Library, 539 U.S. at 221.
268. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 685 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Hearing on Internet Indecency before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 105th
Cong. 2d Sess., 64 (1998).
272. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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from commercial pornography. ' 273 Furthermore, Breyer explained his nar-
row construction of COPA stating that "we must interpret the Act to save
it, not to destroy it."
274
Finally, Justice Breyer discussed the actual less restrictive alternatives
available to Congress by addressing two of the majority's proposed alterna-
tives. Breyer labeled the majority's assertion that Congress could en-
courage and incentivize the use of filtering software as unrealistic. 75
Breyer declared that "the Constitution does not, because it cannot, require
the Government to disprove the existence of magic solutions," for edu-
cated minds can always imagine some kind of slightly less restrictive ap-
proach.276 Secondly, Breyer felt that the majority's alternative of
decriminalizing COPA would simply render it less effective, removing any
teeth from its punitive provisions. 77 He summarized his conclusions stat-
ing that COPA imposed minor burdens on speech that adults may over-
come through modest cost, and he found "no serious, practically available
'less restrictive' way similarly to further this compelling interest. Hence,
the Act is constitutional.
278
Justice Breyer followed his analysis of the pertinent subject matter
with a general airing of grievances regarding the majority's handling of the
case. He posed the rhetorical question, "what has happened to the 'con-
structive discourse between our courts and our legislatures' that 'is an inte-
gral and admirable part of the constitutional design'?"279 He questioned
the wisdom of remanding the case to the district court and asked what fur-
ther proceedings are necessary "[a]fter eight years of legislative effort, two
statutes, and three Supreme Court cases. ' 280 Breyer also commented on
Congress's obvious reliance in drafting COPA on the Court's opinion in
Reno, asking "[w]hat else was Congress supposed to do? ' 281 He acknowl-
edged that some Justices have taken the position that Congress cannot
place regulations on the First Amendment and almost condoned the posi-
tion, but chastised those members of the Court for not making their inten-
tions clear.282 Breyer reasonably explained that he felt COPA could have
been saved by a narrow construction and, furthermore, it is the Court's
duty to reconcile a statute's language to the First Amendment, if
possible.283
273. Id.
274. Id. (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937)).
275. Id. at 688.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 689.
278. Id. 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
279. Id. (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 690.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 690-91 (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 180 (2003) ("where a
saving construction of the statute's language 'is fairly possible,' we must adopt it.") (quoting Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
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Breyer also questioned whether the majority's holding would result in
more or less protection for expression since the majority opinion effectively
removed COPA from a prosecutor's options.2 8 4 Breyer argued that COPA
presented a compromise allowing obscene material to be viewed by those
who wish to see it while protecting those whom it may harm.285 He as-
serted that such a middle road helped to avoid any total ban on speech and
that the majority's view may cause some speech to be chilled by the all-or-
nothing laws already in effect.2 86
V. ANALYSIS
A. Construing COPA to Save, Not Destroy
As noted by Justice Kennedy in the majority opinion, COPA was Con-
gress's second attempt at drafting a constitutionally valid statute regulating
minors' access to potentially harmful, sexually explicit material on the In-
ternet. Kennedy also observed that Congress paid careful attention to the
Court's opinion in Reno v. ACLU in drafting COPA by attempting to pla-
cate tentative members of the Court with a more reasoned approach and
tempered language. In fact, until one reads Justice Kennedy's and Justice
Stevens's opinions dissecting COPA and effectively construing certain pro-
visions into arguably valid, but unlikely "worst case scenarios," COPA
reads as a reasonable attempt to regulate commercial pornography. Since
the freedom COPA wishes to constrict is the sacred right of free speech,
perhaps such a construction is warranted to expose any possible abuses.
Furthermore, since the Court granted certiorari only on the narrow issue of
abuse of discretion by the district court in the issuance of the preliminary
injunction and declined to find the Third Circuit's construction of COPA
valid, any criticism must be directed towards the Court's inaction as op-
posed to a faulty interpretation of COPA. However, as Justice Breyer
stated, "we must interpret the Act (COPA) to save it, not destroy it," and
entertaining a reasonable interpretation of COPA is a worthwhile en-
deavor, at least for the drafters' sake.2 87
In order to demystify what Justice Stevens described as "a content-
based restraint on the dissemination of constitutionally protected
speech,'288 a review of Congress's first attempt at Internet regulation,
which resulted in Reno v. ACLU, is required. In Reno, the Communication
Decency Act (CDA) was found by all the members of the Court to be
unconstitutional, and while it was a failed attempt, Congress was wise
enough to learn from the Court's concerns about the CDA in its drafting of
COPA.289
284. Id. at 691 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 687.
288. Id. at 674.
289. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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The majority opinion in Reno found fault with many of the CDA's
provisions, including its standard for determining whether material was
"patently offensive. ' 29" Although the statute included one prong of the
Miller v. California obscenity test, the Court complained that the other two
prongs "critically limit[ed] the uncertain sweep of the obscenity defini-
tion."' 291 Therefore, relying on the Court's instructions in Reno, COPA's
drafters defined "material that is harmful to minors" as:
any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, arti-
cle, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is
obscene or that- (A) the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards, would find, taking the mate-
rial as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to
appeal to, or is designed to pander to the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently
offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sex-
ual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or
perverted sex act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or
post-pubescent female breast; and (C) taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors.292
The Miller test for obscenity, approved as constitutional by the Court, is as
follows:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest... ; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sex-
ual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;
and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.2 9 3
A comparison of the two definitions obviously reveals Congress's mo-
tivation and apparent surrender to the Court's will regarding obscenity de-
terminations. As Justice Breyer discussed in his dissent, the additions to
the Miller test in COPA's definition of "material that is harmful to minors"
are negligible.294 Congress simply supplemented the language of the Court
in Miller to properly tailor the inquiry to minors and further the purpose of
the statute. Undoubtedly COPA's drafters considered inserting the Miller
290. Id. at 873.
291. Id.
292. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000).
293. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)
(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957))).
294. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 677-80 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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test, unmodified, into the statute, but decided against it since the addition
tailored the statute to its subject matter without altering the scope of its
analysis and conclusion. As was recognized by Justice Breyer, salacious
material that elicits a sexual response from minors will also appeal to the
prurient interest of some adults, and therefore this threshold requirement
of COPA did not expand the obscenity test prescribed by the Court in
Miller.295
Moreover, the majority opinion chose to ignore an opportunity to nar-
row COPA even further by acknowledging the context of the Miller test.
In Miller, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, confidently stated
"[u]nder the holdings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecu-
tion for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials
depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically
defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed."'96 Clearly
COPA was not a state law; however, the Court could have simply declared
in its opinion that it was construing COPA, a federal law, to only apply to
hard-core materials as defined by COPA's definition of "material that is
harmful to minors," because this is the application for which the test was
prescribed. Since COPA's definition of "material that is harmful to mi-
nors" is "any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article,
recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene ... "297
continuing with the Miller test immediately following, this construction
would allow COPA to apply only to obscene materials or materials depict-
ing "patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct." '298 Such a declaration
by the Court would result in an obvious overlap of obscene materials and
materials portraying hard-core sexual conduct, but more importantly, it
would protect borderline material such as J.D. Salinger's Catcher in the Rye
or Kenneth Starr's report on the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, as only the
most ambitious prosecutor would classify this material as describing hard-
core sexual conduct with no other value besides appealing to the prurient
interest.
Also apparent from a plain reading of COPA's "material that is harm-
ful to minors" definition is the limiting provision of the Miller test that the
regulated speech must, "taken as a whole, [lack] serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value" in order to be proscribed.299 The Court in
Reno listed the lack of a provision such as this in the CDA as a factor that
led to the statute being struck down as unconstitutional. In comparing the
CDA to the New York state statute the Court upheld in Ginsberg v. New
York, the Reno Court included this omission in a list of four provisions
differentiating the two laws.3 °° Thus, Congress, attempting to learn from
295. Id. at 679.
296. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added).
297. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6).
298. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.
299. Compare Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, with 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6).
300. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 865-66 (1997).
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its past mistakes and striving to comply with the dictates of the Court, in-
serted the third leg of the Miller test into COPA.
Also listed by the Reno Court among its four differentiating character-
istics was the lack of a provision limiting the CDA to commercial transac-
tions. COPA's drafters, paying close attention to the Court's opinion,
virtually centered the statute around a "commercial purposes" require-
ment.3 °l COPA's title declares that its goal is to restrict "access by minors
to materials commercially distributed by means of world wide web that are
harmful to minors. "302 COPA further provides that an individual is in vio-
lation of the Act only if he or she "knowingly causes the material that is
harmful to minors to be posted ... with the objective of earning a profit
.... 303 Thus, an individual must purposely post obscene or hard-core
material on the Internet with the purpose of making a profit in order to
even warrant inquiry under COPA.
However, even a business engaged in commercial pornography would
not violate COPA as long as it took reasonable measures to keep children
from accessing its sites. COPA section 231(c)(1) provided an affirmative
defense to prosecution if the defendant, in good faith, restricted access to
materials harmful to minors.30 4 The provider is protected under this provi-
sion as long as the website required verification by credit card, debit ac-
count, adult access code, adult personal identification number, digital
certificate verifying age, or any other reasonable measure feasible under
available technology.305 The CDA also contained an affirmative defense
provision that provided a defense if the transmitter restricted access by re-
quiring use of a verified credit card or adult identification.0 6 The Court
relied on the district court's finding that this defense was "not economically
feasible for noncommercial speakers to employ such verification" and con-
cluded that the defense did not narrow the scope of the statute enough to
save it. 30 7 However, COPA clearly would not apply to noncommercial
speakers due to the commercial transactions requirements, and thus
COPA's drafters satisfied the Reno Court's wishes again.
Justice Stevens did, however, raise a valid point in his concurrence re-
garding the burden-shifting effect of COPA. "[E]ven full compliance with
COPA cannot guarantee freedom from prosecution. Speakers who duti-
fully place their content behind age screens may nevertheless find them-
selves in court, forced to prove the lawfulness of their speech on the pain of
criminal conviction. ''3° Although it may be argued that such occurrences
are simply part of the risk associated with being a purveyor of commercial
301. See 47 U.S.C. § 231(e).
302. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (emphasis added).
303. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(B).
304. 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1).
305. Id.
306. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 881 (1997).
307. Id.
308. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 674 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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pornography, this provision spawns a feeling of uneasiness in most Ameri-
cans. COPA's affirmative action provision, by effectively transferring the
burden of proving the lawfulness of speech to the speaker, makes the ac-
cused prove innocence, which does not comport with the traditional con-
cept of the American legal system and raises many free-speech concerns.
Congress may not have drafted the perfect statute, but COPA could
still be a viable source of protection for minors were it not significantly
narrowed by the Court's literal construction of it. Plainly stated, COPA
applies to commercial pornographers who do not take any reasonable mea-
sures to restrict children under seventeen years of age from accessing their
product. COPA's drafters diligently pursued the Court's approval by tai-
loring COPA to conform with the Court's recommendations in Reno, but
their efforts still did not satisfy a majority of the Court's members. In Jus-
tice Breyer's words, "What else was Congress supposed to do?" 3 9 The
Court, which the nation looks to for opinions fortified with reasonableness,
did not appear reasonable in the least with the issuing of the majority opin-
ion in Ashcroft v. ACLU. A review of the United States Supreme Court's
cases struggling with defining and regulating obscenity points out the diffi-
culty the nine-member Court has had in this area. Given Congress's multi-
tude of conflicting interests, how does the Court expect the 535 members of
Congress to concoct a more precise definition than the Miller test? Surely,
the First Amendment should not suffer due to Congress's struggle to satisfy
the high burden of drafting the perfect statute, but COPA plainly supplied
sufficient warnings to commercial pornographers who did not feel an obli-
gation to limit children's access to sexually explicit materials. Thus, the
statute could, and should, have been saved instead of destroyed.
B. Filtering and Blocking Software: An Effective Alternative?
COPA, as a content-based speech regulation, warranted strict scrutiny
despite Justice Scalia's best efforts to hold on to "pandering," and thus the
Court correctly asked whether COPA was "the least restrictive means
among available, effective alternatives."310 The majority answered this
question in the negative, proposing that filtering and blocking software was
less restrictive than COPA and likely more effective in restricting minors'
access to potentially harmful sexual materials.311 However, the Court pro-
claimed the benefits of filtering and blocking software perhaps too enthusi-
astically, as at least one concurring Justice and the named plaintiffs in the
action contradicted the Court's conclusions in prior records.
First, in a 1998 Hearing on Internet Indecency before the Senate Com-
mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the ACLU, named peti-
tioner in this action, harshly criticized filtering and blocking software and
testified that the software was "simply incapable of discerning between
309. Id. at 690 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 666.
311. Id. at 667-68.
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constitutionally protected and unprotected speech. ' '3 12 The ACLU also de-
clared that "filtering software block[s] out valuable and protected informa-
tion, such as information about the Quaker religion, and web sites
including those of the American Association of University Women, the
AIDS Quilt, [and] the Town Hall Political Site .. ,,.13 Further, the ACLU
claimed filtering software "inappropriately blocks valuable protected
speech, and does not effectively block the site [it is] intended to block." '3 1 4
Justice Stevens, only one year and six days before Ashcroft v. ACLU
was decided, also found "fundamental defects" in the filtering software that
was available or likely to develop in the near future.31 5 In United States v.
American Library Ass'n, Justice Stevens's dissent declared that the same
software the majority in Ashcroft v. ACLU proposed Congress promote
with federal funds was grossly under- and overinclusive.31 6 "Because the
software relies on key words or phrases to block undesirable sites, it does
not have the capacity to exclude a precisely defined category of images.
317
He maintained that a statute using filtering software as a way to protect
children from sexual materials would "provide parents with a false sense of
security without really solving the problem," since "it is inevitable that a
substantial amount of material will never be blocked. ' 318 Stevens also ab-
horred the software's potential for overblocking, claiming that "thousands
of pages that contain content that is completely innocuous for both adults
and minors" would be unnecessarily restricted. 319 He concluded that
"[n]either the interest in suppressing unlawful speech nor the interest in
protecting children from access to harmful materials justifies this overly
broad restriction on adult access to protected speech.
321
Justice Breyer also cited other valid practical reasons filtering software
fell short of COPA's properly interpreted provisions in his dissent in Ash-
croft v. ACLU. He noted the monetary cost of filtering software and the
inability of parents to guarantee that filtering software is on every com-
puter their children use. 321 As Breyer succinctly pointed out, not every
family has the means to purchase filtering software, while commercial
pornographers who profit from the dissemination of material harmful to
minors can shoulder the cost COPA imposes on them with relative ease.322
Computers pervade children's lives and a minor is usually no more than a
312. Id. at 686 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Hearing on Internet Indecency before the S. Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 105th Cong. 2d Sess., 64 (1998).
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 221-22 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
316. Id.
317. Id. at 221.
318. Id. at 222.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 685 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
322. Id. ("Not every family has the $40 or so necessary to install [filtering software].... By way
of contrast, age screening costs less .. .[only] up to 20 cents per password or $20 per user for an
identification number.")
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few clicks away from potentially harmful material. The majority showcased
its disconnect from everyday Americans by ignoring the fact that parents,
no matter how zealously they attempt to keep harmful Internet materials
from their children, cannot supervise a child's Internet use all the time.
Certainly, as Breyer advocated, imposing a modest burden on adults seek-
ing such material is a more sensible solution than requiring parents to be
omniscient.
Considering the mountain of evidence and conclusions from diverse
parties, the majority's declaration that filtering software is more effective
than COPA's provisions is somewhat suspect. It is true that Justice Ken-
nedy recognized that "[f]iltering software ... is not a perfect solution to the
problem of children gaining access to harmful-to-minors materials." '323
However, by this statement, Justice Kennedy helps to invalidate his own
conclusion that filtering software is more effective than COPA. The major-
ity's purported "better" alternative to COPA is passive at best, as filtering
software is "part of the status quo," as Justice Breyer argued.324 Because
filtering software is currently available to any parent with the means and
will to purchase it, and Justice Kennedy acknowledges that the "problem of
children gaining access to harmful-to-minors materials" still exists, the ma-
jority calls for Congress's promotion of a defective solution. How can the
promotion of a less-than-effective means of regulation remedy a problem
that it is currently failing to correct?
The majority also argued that filtering and blocking software may be
more effective than COPA on one fact alone: COPA cannot regulate the
estimated forty percent of pornography from foreign countries.325 Justice
Kennedy added that the statute's "[e]ffectiveness [was] likely to diminish
even further if COPA [were] upheld, because the providers of the materials
that would be covered by the statute simply can move their operation over-
seas." 326 This statement ignores that any parent concerned with his or her
child's access to harmful materials would not scoff at a sixty percent reduc-
tion in the chances of encountering hard-core pornography on the Internet.
Furthermore, Kennedy's statement ignores the transaction cost, logistical
challenges, and increased overhead associated with an international move
by any business which, when compared with the relatively insignificant ex-
pense of complying with COPA, seriously reduces the likelihood of this
scenario. In the alternative, if COPA did force commercial pornographers
engaging in unprotected speech to move their operation overseas to evade
the reaches of the statute, would a mass exodus of domestic commercial
pornographers be so undesirable?
By comparing the criteria that the majority believed would constitute a
true alternative to COPA-"least restrictive means," "available," and "ef-
fective"-filtering and blocking software falls one short of this hat trick.
323. Id. at 668.
324. Id. at 684 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 667.
326. Id.
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Filtering and blocking software is simply not as effective as COPA, and
therefore did not constitute a feasible alternative to Congress's best efforts.
It must be noted that the district court found that the government did not
present sufficient evidence to show that filtering software was less effective
than COPA's provisions; however, such a conclusion was fully in the discre-
tion of the Supreme Court if its members chose to so conclude. Perhaps
the majority was feeling conservatively liberal on June 29, 2004,327 not
wanting to be accused of judicial activism. However, by only affirming the
district court's preliminary injunction and sending this case on another leg
of its never-ending odyssey, the Court effectively told Congress to market
filtering software to parents instead of telling pornographers to restrict ac-
cess to minors at a minimal cost.
C. Practical, at Least in Theory
One definition of the word "practical" is "[o]f, relating to, governed
by, or acquired through practice or action, rather than theory, speculation,
or ideals."3 Justice Kennedy asserted that "[t]here are important practi-
cal reasons to let the injunction stand pending a full trial on the merits." '329
Kennedy felt that "the potential harms from reversing the injunction out-
weigh[ed] those of leaving it in place by mistake," and also that there was
"a potential for extraordinary harm and serious chill upon protected
speech."330 It could also be argued that the potential harm to minors
through continued exposure to sexually explicit materials outweighed the
possibility that borderline indecent speech would be chilled. Therefore, to
ascertain which course of action would result in the most practical solution,
one must consider the viability of the harms.
Since Justice Kennedy chose to ignore a discussion of the potential for
harm to children that might occur if the injunction were upheld, a short
review of pornography's harmful effects on children is warranted. Expos-
ing children to pornography can have a multitude of adverse effects on
their emotional and sexual well-being. One study found a correlation be-
tween early exposure to pornography (under fourteen years of age) and a
greater involvement in deviant sexual activities, particularly rape.331 Fur-
thermore, experts in child psychology look for two possibilities when chil-
dren engage in premature sexual activity: experience and exposure. Such
activity likely means that the child may have been exposed to sexuality
through pornography.
332
Generally, children mimic and imitate adult activities they observe,
and no study is needed to prove that children will be more likely to engage
327. The date of the Court's decision in Ashcroft. Id. at 656.
328. Am. Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1421 (Anne H. Soukhanov ed., 3d ed.,
Houghton Mifflin Co. 1996).
329. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 670.
330. Id. at 671.
331. DONNA RICE HUGHES WITH PAMELA T. CAMPBELL, KIDS ONLINE: PROTECTING YOUR CHIL-
DREN IN CYBERSPACE 83 (1998).
332. Id. at 88.
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in sex if they are exposed to it without supervision. At least one expert
argues that "pornography short-circuits and/or distorts the normal person-
ality development process and supplies misinformation about a child's sex-
uality, sense of self, and body that leaves the child confused, changed, and
damaged.""'
Hughes and Campbell describe the effect of pornography on children:
During certain critical periods of childhood, a child's brain
is being programmed for sexual orientation. During this pe-
riod, the mind appears to be developing a "hardwire" for
what the person will be aroused by or attracted to. Expo-
sure to healthy sexual norms and attitudes during this criti-
cal period can result in the child developing a healthy sexual
orientation. In contrast, if there is exposure to pornography
during this period, sexual deviance may become imprinted
on the child's "hard drive" and become a permanent part of
his or her sexual orientation.334
Clearly, the possibility of actual harm occurring through a child's exposure
to pornography is very real, and not in the least theoretical.
Justice Kennedy's concern that some free speech would be chilled is
likely valid, yet the harm resulting from a reversal of the preliminary in-
junction pales in comparison to pornography's effect on children. Any chill
on protected speech would be minimal and continue only as long as the
court system took to decide the fate of COPA. Would not a more practical
majority opinion be concerned with the possible harm to children if the
injunction were upheld as opposed to a possible chill on pornographic post-
ings? And further, might a temporary chill on such postings be beneficial
by helping limit minors' access to sexually explicit material? Adults would
still have access to, according to Justice Kennedy's estimates, forty percent
of online pornography without providing any information, and access to all
domestic sites with the modest burden of providing some reasonable type
of age verification. Of course, the majority opinion was dutifully guarding
the freedom of speech from potential abuses; however, the staunch theoret-
ical position that no regulation of speech is valid can have harmful practical
effects, and in this case, children came up on the wrong side of theory.
D. In Pursuit of the Perfect Balance: Protecting Children
and the Freedom of Speech
Any dispute involving such passion-inducing topics as the freedom of
speech and the well-being of children is difficult and complex, but the diffi-
culty of reaching a mutually satisfying resolution increases exponentially
when these two interests are put in conflicting positions. Also, given this
case's meandering procedural history, going on for years, and the Court's
333. Id. at 92.
334. Id. at 91-92.
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remand of the dispute for more in-depth fact-finding, the situation is aggra-
vated even further. However, fault is not readily allotted upon either of
the conflicting positions in this case-Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
and Justice Breyer's dissent are both masterfully written, reasoned, and
fully defensible in any arena.
The central catalyst for disagreement between the two positions is
each Justice's conflicting interpretation of COPA. Justice Breyer at-
tempted to salvage COPA by putting a "constitutionally valid" spin on
COPA's provisions, while Justice Kennedy refrained from any construction
and sided with the district court judge that COPA likely burdened some
protected speech. Perhaps Justice Kennedy's majority opinion did the
"right" thing by refraining from deciding more than required and allowing
the district court to dig into new and more current facts while providing the
government one more chance to save COPA. However, this course of ac-
tion may effectively invalidate COPA simply due to the ever-advancing na-
ture of the Internet. Perhaps Justice Breyer's opinion would have been the
"right" course given the harmful effects of pornography on children and
the minimal effects COPA would have on protected indecent speech. Both
arguments warrant respect, and District Court Judge Reed of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania faces a difficult challenge on remand.
VI. CONCLUSION
Throughout the epic history of this case, every judicial officer con-
fronted with this dilemma has noted the importance of protecting children
from sexually explicit material, yet their mentioning of this "most compel-
ling interest" seems to have been no more than lip service, considering the
results. In the name of protecting free speech, the Court has effectively left
America's children to the pornographic wolves by not securing them from
the harmful effects of commercial pornography. The Court purports to ap-
preciate the significance of the phenomenon that is the Internet and its role
in everyday life, yet the reality is that the Court has not taken sufficient
measures to ensure that children can access the web without being exposed
to sexually explicit material.
The Court has arguably been led astray due to the abstract nature of
the Internet and the uncharted territory the Internet treads. For example,
the Court does not allow adult theaters and adult bookstores within several
city blocks of a school, church, or other sensitive area,335 but will allow a
pornography vendor to peddle his wares to children while in the safety of
their own homes. Of course, the Court allows zoning restrictions based on
the negative secondary effects adult theaters and adult nightclubs on sur-
rounding areas, yet fails to recognize the seriousness of the negative secon-
dary effects that pornography has on children. Simply by asking an adult
for some reasonable type of age verification, COPA could prevent a child
from stumbling upon hard-core sexual images while researching a science
335. Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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project or book report. Is this simple request truly unreasonable or oppres-
sive? By invalidating COPA, the Court has shown that it feels more com-
fortable with this outcome than with the "tragic" possibility that a
webmaster may not feel free to post questionably indecent material on his
sometimes pornographic, sometimes artistic websites. It is difficult to im-
agine that this is the reality the Framers of the Constitution wished to effect
when drafting the First Amendment.

